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SUN ZI STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES
by Alastair
Iain Johnston 江忆恩
Associate
Professor
Government
Department
July
25, 1999
INTRODUCTION
There
is no doubt that in the 1980s and 1990s American scholars, business people and military officers have become more
aware of Sun Zi’s
Art of War. Phrases and axioms from Sun Zi’s text have also gradually moved into the popular
imagination through some well-placed lines in movies, by comments from famous sports
figures, and in other arenas of popular culture. For instance, Gordon Gecko, the
evil protagonist businessman in the popular 1980s movie “Wall Street”, quoted Sun Zi in the
movie. The famous National Basketball Association coach Pat Riley quotes Sun Zi in his book
The Winner Within: A Life Plan for Team Players (1993).
TRANSLATIONS
The
publication of scholarly translations of the Sun Zi text by major American publishing houses has
remained relatively constant over the 1990s. As Figure 1 shows, there has been
no major surge in new translations or new book-length analyses of the text. The
annual production of books on Sun Zi has remained relatively constant.
As of the late 1990s, there are five main translations of Sun Zi used by American academics, business people and/or military officers. The first is Samuel
Griffiths,
a retired U.S. Marine general at the time he translated Sun
Zi, used the Song
Ben Shi Yi Jia Zhu Sun Zi (宋 本十一家注孙子) version as
his basic text.
Indeed, the value of Griffiths
translation is that he provides translations from historical
commentators on the text. This allows readers to examine the nuanced differences
in how particular passages were interpreted at different points in Chinese
history. The other value to the text is the forward by the famous British strategist,
Basil Liddell Hart. Hart used Sun Zi to justify his critique of Clausewitz for
his over-emphasis on the so-called ‘direct’ approach, defined as the massive application
of military power at the enemy’s ‘center of gravity’. Liddell Hart blamed Clausewitizian
thinking for the disasterous violence of the First World War (subsequent
defenders of Clausewitz accuse Liddell Hart of misreading the German strategists
and for mistakening playing up differences between Clausewitz and Sun Zi). While Griffiths ’ translation is
easy to read, as Chinese scholars have pointed out
much of the information the translations provides about the Sun
Zi text itself and
about its impact on Chinese military thought is out of date. New research on
the Griffiths text has
focused on the relationship between the historical context of his translation.
Griffiths saw his text has a tool for
influencing senior US
military and political
leaders about how to deal with revolutionary warfare in the Third
World .
According
to one scholar who has examined Griffiths
papers and letters, Griffiths asked
that the publisher of his translation distribute copies to top leaders in the Department
of Defense, Department of State and the White House, as well as key journalists
and opinion-makers. The goals was to warn US strategic decisionmakers
about the methods that China ,
North Vietnam
and other revolutionary
states were using to threaten United
States interests. 2
This
version has little scholarly value, however, as it is simply a re-publication
of Lionel Giles 1910 version, with a few minor footnotes and comments. The
introduction claims, rather hyperbolically, that the text should be required
reading for US military officers because were they to internalized Sun Zi’s teachings
they would be able to avoid costly conflicts in the future. A second
translation that appeared in the 1980s was done by Thomas Cleary.4
Cleary,
a translator of many other texts from the Buddhist and Daoist traditions,
stresses the defensive, even Daoist, nature of Sun Zi’s text. This translation, however, is highly
controversial among Sinologists, some of whom believe he takes too many
liberties with the original text, injecting meanings that are not justified by
the original Chinese language. Neither the Clavell nor the Cleary translations
is taken very seriously by Sinologists, and for the most part neither translations
is used in the US
military education system. In the 1990s two new major translations appeared,
one by Ralph Sawyer, a Hong Kong
based businessperson, and one by Roger Ames, a philosophy professor at the University of Hawaii .5
Sawyer
first published a translation of Sun Zi as part of the first English translation of the
entire Seven Military Classics (WuJing Qi Shu) in 1993. This was
followed in 1994 by a separate translation of the Sun Zi text alone. The Sawyer text focuses on Sun Zi as a manual
for military strategy and operations. Thus it provides a fairly extensive
discussion of the patterns in warfare, strategy, tactics and weapons from the
Shang dynasty through
to
the Warring States period. Sawyer provides extensive footnotes to pre-modern and
modern specialists on Sun Zi
in order to establish the historical accuracy of the text and its references to
warfare of the Warring States period. In particularly he relies on the research
work of Professor Li Ling from Peking
University and Professor Wu Rusong from the Academy of Military
Sciences . In his translation, Sawyer also examines
a range of earlier annotations and commentaries. He relies heavily on the Ming
dynasty commentator, Liu Yin’s Wu Jing Qi Shu Zhijie (明本武经七书直解) and on the retired Guomingdang general Wei
Rulin’s Sun Zi
Bing Fa Da Quan (孙子兵法大全)
Because Sawyer tends to
focus on the operational side of the text -- how it was used historically, what
it says about historical warfare in ancient China, and what advice it provides
practitioners of warfare -- his translation is used in many of the institutions
in the US military education system.
The Ames text focuses more on the differences
between Chinese and Western philosophical traditions and how the Sun Zi text can be
treated as a text on philosophy. He notes that he is interested in the “cultural
presuppositions” that are needed to understand Sun Zin from “its own world
view”. Ames argues that military philosophy was a common topic in many of the
works on political philosophy in ancient China and thus should be seen as a
part of process of developing a distinctive Chinese philosophy, not as a
separate field of military thought. Ames
takes on a question that few Western specialists have asked, namely why is
there such an rich tradition of military philosophy in an allegedly anti-
militarist culture?6
He suggests that military
action provides a metaphor for all other types of human behavior, and that in
Chinese tradition military action was “applied5
philosophy”.
His basic argument is that in both civil and military action the consumate
actor is one whose character tries to achieve order through harmonizing himself
with changing circumstances. In contrast to Western assumptions that there are
two worlds -- a perfect, predestined, independent world that will be created
through purposeful action, a teleology -- ancient Chinese philosophy assumed
that order already existed in things, and was not imposed on things. The Dao
was not a teleology, but a recognition of the completeness of existing reality.
Harmony arose from “personal cultivation and refinement” whether in the civil
or military arenas.
Ames
provides an extensive discussion of several key concepts in the Sun Zi text which,
he argues, reflects this philosophical tradition: the concept of yin 因, or to act in
accord with the enemy, a “responsiveness to one’s context”7; the concept
of shi 势
,
which he translates as “strategic advantage” where all situations can be turned to one’s advantage
through manipulating self and adversary, shaping the environment according to
the concept of yin. Shi relies on genius, not just military skill, since no
situation is ever the same. 8
The Ames text is unique in
that it makes explicit use of the Yin Que Shan manuscript, and the Ma Wang Dui
scripts. He also introduces readers to the evidence concerning the identities
of Sun
Wu and Sun
Bin.
Like Sawyer’s text it also
uses a number of historical and contemporary commentaries. While Sawyer relies
on Liu Yin’s commentaries, Ames
relies heavily on Wu Jiulong’s text for interpretations of key passages.9
###
1 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun
Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)
2 I thank Ed O’Dowd for this information about Griffiths .
3 James Clavell ed., The Art of War: Sun Tzu (New York: Delacort, 1983)
4 Thomas Cleary, translator, The Art of War: Sun Tzu (Boston: Shambala Press, 1988)
5 Ralph Sawyer, translator, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) and Ralph Sawyer, translator, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) and Roger Ames, translator, Sun Tzu The Art of War (New York, Ballantine Books, 1993)
6 Ames p.40
7 Ibid., p.83
8 Ibid., p. 71-80, 8
9 Wu Jiulong, Sun Zi Jiao Shi (孙子校释)(Beijing, Academy of Military Sciences
Press, 1990)
-- More to come ---
This post will be updated and refined later this week.
This post will be updated and refined later this week.
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